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Abstract: The paper focuses the applicability of political cycles theories in specific circumstances of 
economies in transition which are at the same time the new democracies. Economic and 
political transition in these countries change both people’s and politicians’ preferences, 
institutions and generate specific politically motivated misuse of economic policymaking. 
Theories of political cycles in macroeconomics have been developed since 1970s, when the 
fact that policymakers could use economic policy as an efficient tool for increasing their 
chances for reelection became obvious. In countries with parliamentary democracies, in-
centives of policymakers to influence election results could be opportunistically motivated 
(opportunistic models) or ideologically motivated (partisan models). On the other side, 
voters could be naïve or rational, with different economic outcomes, as argued in exten-
sive political cycles literature. The paper studies specific political motives of politicians 
in transition economies which are faced, especially in first fazes of transition with weak 
institutional mechanism and rules, and naïve voters. Consequently, opportunistic motives 
dominate ideological ones. The paper also focuses how the development of the institutional 
environment, especially in the context of international integration, such as accession to the 
European Union, reflects on the political business cycles in these countries.
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Introduction
In parliamentary democracies the conventional analysis of macroeconomic policy 
assumes that economic policymakers are responsible for the country’s economic per-
formance, such as the inflation rate, unemployment rate, and economic growth rate. 
Political economy today considers the connection between economics and politics 
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using the methods of neoclassical economic analysis, rational choice, and game the-
ory. Unlike in the traditional approach, in which the state is exogenous in macroeco-
nomic models, political economy in the domain of macroeconomics, the so-called 
political macroeconomics or the new political macroeconomics, considers the gov-
ernment and its economic policy to be endogenous, assuming that economic policy 
is used to achieve both economic and political goals. This is precisely the focus in 
theories of political business cycles. Political macroeconomics connects economic 
policymakers’ attempts to realize macroeconomic goals through economic policy 
with election cycles and their political motives.
If politics is generally defined as “deciding who gets what, when and how” (Lass-
well 1958), then it is clear that theories of political cycles must include two compo-
nents – economic and ‘political’ politics. The economic goals in the political business 
cycle models are a high economic growth rate, low unemployment rate, low inflation 
rate, and a certain income distribution. Opportunistic motives (to win elections) and 
partisan motives (to fulfil the party’s economic program and partisan goals in the 
field of macroeconomic results that will improve the position of voters or sympa-
thizers of certain parties) appear as political motives that determine the behavior of 
economic policymakers. In models of political cycles, the public, i.e., the voters, are 
given the opportunity to decide on the political prospects of economic policymakers, 
i.e., the politicians in power, based on their success in achieving macroeconomic 
goals (low inflation or unemployment rates, or high economic growth).
Theories of political cycles focus on the character and potential shortcomings of 
a democratic political system that can be misused. However, democracies have rules 
and institutional mechanisms. Therefore, institutions – defined as the rules of the 
game (North 1990, p.3) – that limit possible misuse of economic policy become im-
portant (an independent central bank and transparent monetary policy based on mon-
etary rules, rules for conducting fiscal policy and the action of the fiscal council, etc.). 
Democratic institutions are designed to protect against tyranny and to help convert 
society’s preferences into outcomes. In addition to institutions, the rationality of vot-
ers restricts misuse, as they can punish politicians who abuse economic policy by not 
re- electing them, thus deterring economic policymakers from abusing the system.
Theories of political business cycles have been developed for the conditions of par-
liamentary democracies as they exist in developed economies. In addition to the tradi-
tional sources of political business cycles, a very extensive literature considers various 
aspects of the democratic process and system on the one hand, and economic policy 
on the other. Thus, it considers the economic policy of coalition governments versus 
those led by majority governments, the greater propensity of coalition governments to 
run budget deficits, and the fact that budget policy cycles result more frequently from 
the misuse of fiscal policy than of monetary policy. Modern theories of political cycles 
examine the reasons why even in a situation where voters are rational and the political 
system is democratic, it is possible for economic policy to still be abused.
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Economies in transition, also called ‘new democracies’, became a special area 
of research in the theories and models of political cycles, due to the fact that the 
economic transition in these countries took place hand in hand with a new wave of 
democratization. The specifics of these countries were significant because the eco-
nomic and political systems were changing at the same time, which is considered 
to be the biggest global institutional change in the recent past. The economic and 
political institutional changes were decisive for the success of the economic transi-
tion, as this paper will show. They also affected the possibility of politicians abusing 
economic policy, because the development of institutions limits such abuses. The 
construction of economic and democratic institutions in transition countries has also 
been examined in connection with their accession to the European Union and the 
standards imposed in the accession process. The transition countries that joined the 
EU were more successful in both changing their institutional framework and limiting 
the political abuse of economic policy.
The rest of this paper examines the context in which theories of political cycles 
emerged by focusing on the most important turning points in the theoretical and 
methodological development of macroeconomics. It then turns its attention to the ap-
plication of the political cycle model in transition economies, focusing on the specific 
characteristics of voters and motives of economic policymakers. The importance of 
building economic and political institutions to limit abuse by politicians in power in 
transition countries is considered, as well as the factors that determine their creation.
The development of political cycle theories in modern macroeconomics
Political business cycle models have been important in macroeconomics since the 
1970s, when it became clear that the idea of benevolent economic policymakers con-
cerned exclusively with social welfare was unrealistic. After the Second World War 
the implementation of Keynesian economic policy, with its goal of establishing full 
employment and increasing social welfare through the active use of fiscal policy, meant 
that governments became an important factor in the functioning of the economic sys-
tem. In 1943 Michal Kalecki formulated the concept of ‘full-employment capitalism’ 
in which the factor of labor gained in importance, reflecting the increased power of the 
working class and contributing to greater equity in the distribution of income between 
collective actors (social classes). However, when profits began to decline, wages rose 
above productivity growth, and production capacities recorded significant underuti-
lization, with persistent and rising inflation, Keynes’s theory and Keynesian econom-
ic policy were blamed. The recessions during the 1970s, atypical because they were 
accompanied by rising inflation, led to the abandonment of the Keynesian economic 
system and helped establish the dominance of neoliberal ideas in economic theory and 
politics, which persisted until the last Great Recession (2007–2009).
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From the 1970s, ‘full-employment capitalism’ was replaced by the radical an-
ti-Keynesian conclusions of ‘free-market macroeconomics’ (Akerlof 2007, pp.6–7), 
which held an intellectual monopoly in macroeconomics that resulted in a lack of 
pluralism in macroeconomic ideas. The changes that took place in the dominant 
macroeconomic paradigm, first with the rise of monetarism and later with the New 
Classical macroeconomics based on the revolution of rational expectations, had a 
significant impact on the emergence and development of theories of political business 
cycles.
Traditional political business cycle models
The influence of modern macroeconomics was pervasive and went far beyond eco-
nomic theory. First, the insistence on the mistakes of Keynesian economic policy 
showed that the real motives of the economic policymakers were primarily political. 
This encouraged the development of political cycle theories that directly link the 
results of political elections with economic results, an idea that had been present in 
earlier economic analysis (for example,  Anthony Downs’ famous book An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (1957), or the above mentioned paper by Polish economist Mi-
chal Kalecki, Political Aspects of Full Employment (1943)). However,  by the 1970s 
government had played an active role in the economy for decades, and there had been 
episodes in which economic policy was abused in pre-election periods to improve 
economic performance in order to win elections. In 1975 Nordhaus formalized the 
first model of political business cycles in order to explain episodes in which President 
Nixon had misused economic policy. The Nordhaus model, together with the models 
of Lindbeck (1976) and Tufte (1978), belongs to the traditional opportunistic political 
business cycle model in which opportunistically motivated politicians (policymakers) 
face naive voters whose expectations are adaptive. In order to be reelected, govern-
ments that are driven by private interests exploit the short-run Philips curve and naive 
voters whose expectations are adaptive by generating a decrease in the unemploy-
ment rate just before an election, at the cost of a rising inflation rate after the election. 
Thus, inflation and unemployment are subject to cyclical fluctuations that follow the 
election cycle.
In the 1970s, changes in economic theory and policy had another important im-
pact on the development of political cycle theory. The doctrinal reasons for aban-
doning Keynesianism and returning to liberal and neoliberal ideas resulted in the 
definitive abandonment of the concept of full-employment capitalism. The rise of 
neoliberal ideas from the 1970s was associated with global political changes and the 
ascendancy of right-wing and conservative parties. Since then, political cycle theories 
have focused on political–partisan issues. According to the partisan political cycle 
model, because party ideologies differ there are ideological differences regarding 
macroeconomic goals and issues such as inflation, unemployment, and economic 
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growth. Thus, partisan motives are the most important political influence in mac-
roeconomic policy. Hibbs (1977) created the first partisan model, dividing the po-
litical spectrum into left and right depending on incumbents’ preferences regarding 
unemployment and inflation: left-wing governments prefer higher employment and 
economic growth, and right-wing governments are more interested in lower infla-
tion with no regard for the unemployment rate1. Like the Nordhaus model, Hibbs’s 
model exploits the short-run Philips curve, and incumbents face naïve voters who 
form adaptive expectations. Thus, Hibbs’s model belongs to the traditional partisan 
political business cycle model.
Rational political business cycle models
The third important impact of the development of modern macroeconomics relates to 
changes in the theoretical and empirical macro model, and includes first adaptive and 
then rational expectations. This was a consequence of persistent and rising inflation, 
which imposed changes on the way wages and prices were formed. Dramatic changes 
in macroeconomic modeling involving expectations and the representative subject 
have also affected models of political cycles. In the neoliberal era successful eco-
nomic policy was based on the mainstream macroeconomic consensus, a new neo-
classical synthesis in which dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
were developed based on rational expectations, intertemporal choice, and new econo-
metric methods. Thus, until the 2007–2009 crisis the macroeconomic mainstream 
was based on the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics, the ‘equilibrium’ 
framework, and the hypothetical-deductive abstract approach2 to modeling individu-
als’ behavior, which together determine both macroeconomic outcomes and macro-
economic trends (Praščević 2014, p.23).
The rational expectations revolution radically changed macroeconomic theory 
and modeling (Lucas 1976; Lucas and Sargent 1979), but it was equally important for 
the development of political business cycle models. In opportunistic models the vot-
ers were rational rather than naïve, which is why incumbents cannot exploit the short-
run Philips curve in order to systematically deceive voters with pre-election econom-
ic stimulation. Since then, rational opportunistic political business cycle models have 
been developed. Because the rationality of voters limits the possibility of pre-election 
manipulation, the models had to find other ways that voters could be deceived and in-
troduced the assumption of asymmetric information, available to politicians in power 
on the one hand and to voters on the other. Asymmetry primarily refers to the compe-
tency of the government, which is defined in different ways: the ability to implement 
appropriate fiscal policy (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990), ensuring economic 
growth without inflation (Pearson and Tabellini 1990), or isolating the economy from 
accidental shocks (Cukierman and Melzer 1986).
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The rationality of voters has also been introduced into partisan political business 
cycle models. The Italian economist Alberto Alesina introduced systematic partisan 
differences regarding macroeconomic goals and policies into models with rational 
expectations in which voters prefer the policies of left-wing or right-wing parties 
(Alesina 1987, 1988, 1989; Alesina and Sachs 1988; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995). 
Thus, politicians wanting to address centrist voters can abandon their original ideol-
ogy and change their macroeconomic goals over the electoral cycle  in order to in-
crease their prospects of reelection. In this way electoral uncertainty has real effects 
on macroeconomic policy and outcomes, inducing macroeconomic instability. In the 
world of rational expectations only unexpected inflationary/deflationary shocks have 
real effects, which may be a consequence of electoral uncertainty that can cause 
shocks with temporary real macroeconomic effects. However, although partisan po-
litical motives do not result in systematic cycles of macroeconomic variables, there is 
a correlation between political and institutional stability and the country’s economic 
indicators: greater instability and polarization are associated with poor economic in-
dicators (high inflation and unemployment rates). Thus, empirical results have signif-
icant normative implications that are related to the conduct of economic policy on the 
basis of rules rather than discretionary powers, institutional change (introducing an 
independent central bank and fiscal council), and coordination of economic policy.
Political cycles in monetary and fiscal policy
In addition to distinguishing opportunistic and partisan political business cycles, 
there is a difference between models that focus on monetary policy misuse and those 
that analyze fiscal policy misuse. If the focus is on monetary policy, then the analysis 
must become more complex by including an institutional framework for the rela-
tionship between politicians and an independent or semi-independent central bank 
(Rogoff 1985; Alesina and Sachs 1988; Waller 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993; 
Persson and Tabellini 1994; Alesina and Gatti 1995; Walsh 1995; Svensson 1995; 
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997).
As changes in the institutional mechanisms of monetary policy have reduced the 
possibility of monetary policy misuse, as central banks have become more indepen-
dent globally, political budget cycle (PBC) models have become more important. 
These models analyze the relationship between the electoral cycle and fiscal policy, 
including the following issues: whether budget deficits are higher in pre-electoral 
periods, whether manipulation of the budget is an effective tool for gaining votes, 
what the role of partisan politics is in framing fiscal policymaking (differences be-
tween left-wing and right-wing parties regarding their fiscal priorities – the levels 
and structure of public expenditure and the size of budget deficits), whether budget 
deficits depend on the type of government (coalition, majority, or presidental), and 
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whether the political budget cycles are more important phenomena in transition and 
developing economies than in advanced economies (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 
2004; Brender and Drazen 2005; Shi and Svensson 2002, 2006; Klašnja 2008). The 
political budget cycle models explain misuse of fiscal policy within the framework 
of asymmetric information regarding government competence (Rogoff and Sibert 
1988; Rogoff 1990; Drazen and Eslava 2005, 2006), public debt as a strategic vari-
able (Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Persson and Svensson 1989), and fiscal illusion and 
distributional conflict (Alesina and Drazen 1991).
The political economy of transition: facts and impact on political cycle theories
Economic transition began in the 1990s in socialist countries with centrally planned 
economic systems and in countries of the former Social Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia with a specific form of self-governing socialism. It was a wide-ranging process 
of transformation of a command economic system into a market economy, and of 
a one-party political system into a democratic system of parliamentary democracy 
(a type of polyarchy). Thus, in the following decades this group of countries, other-
wise extremely heterogeneous, became not only a group of ‘transition’ economies, 
but also ‘new democracies’ characterized by transitional political systems with the 
characteristics of both unconsolidated democracies and semi-democratic systems. 
These countries implemented economic and political reforms at different speeds and 
achieved different results in building a market economic system (measured by indica-
tors of transitional progress) and political democracy (consolidation of the democratic 
system). Therefore, some of them successfully completed these processes, becoming 
members of the European Union, while others remain ‘stuck’ in these processes with 
unfinished economic transformation and as semi- consolidated or non-consolidated 
democracies.
The transition from state socialism to capitalism, which for most socialist coun-
tries started between 1989 and 19913, could be defined as a specific kind of experi-
ment in modern history affecting around 30 countries4. The economic and political 
transformations have been equally important, since the beginning was marked by the 
collapse of the one-party political system.
At first the process of economic transition received a lot of support because peo-
ple expected greater economic freedoms, such as decentralized decision-making ar-
rangements and private- sector market transactions, and greater political freedoms, 
including human rights, which had been denied in previous decades. The expectation 
was that citizens would find it easier to accept the temporary worsening of their 
economic position in the first phases of the transition because they were being com-
pensated with the desired human rights and political freedoms. However, economic 
transition proved to be both costly and painful for many citizens who witnessed an 
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erosion of living standards and public services and high levels of poverty and in-
equality over a longer period of time. On the other hand, for certain interest groups 
and sections of society – mostly connected with the previous socialist economic and 
political elite – who were able to utilize their resources to participate in the privat-
ization process, economic transition offered extraordinary opportunities for politi-
cal and financial gain. This continues to be the case in countries that have neither 
successfully implemented and completed the economic transition nor developed a 
consolidated democratic system. In these countries the enthusiasm for economic re-
form has diminished, as has enthusiasm for building a democratic system and dem-
ocratic institutions, leading many citizens to turn to non-democratic political forces 
that promise authoritarian rule to reduce their economic and social problems. These 
countries appear to be stuck in a process of unending economic transition, and the 
ideals of economic and political liberalism on which the economic transition was 
initially based have almost disappeared. These are the key reasons why countries in 
transition are lagging behind in both developing democracy and economic develop-
ment.
This is why the interaction between politics and economics in the political econo-
my of transition is so important. The literature in this area of research is vast and in-
cludes the politics of economic reforms, the captured state and corruption, rent-seek-
ing activities of policymakers in transition economies, and specific institutional 
arrangements that reduce economic growth. This paper focuses specifically on the 
impact of economic transition on the existence of political business cycles.
Speed and success of the economic transition
Initially, there was a wide range of transition economies, from the successful Central 
European and Baltic States that completed the transition process, through the insuf-
ficiently successful countries of Southeast Europe, to the former Soviet Union and 
East Asian countries. According to the World Bank, countries that joined the Euro-
pean Union have finished transiting (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in the first-wave of accession on 1 May 
2004; Bulgaria and Romania in the second-wave of accession on 1 January 2007; 
and finally Croatia, which joined the EU on 1 July 2013). The experiences of former 
socialist countries that have successfully acceded to EU membership and of the less 
advanced transition countries of the former Soviet Union, regarding both economic 
and political reforms and including the role of policymakers and public support, are 
timely and valuable for understanding the complexity of the transition processes.
In the beginning the direction of the economic transition was clear and was insep-
arably linked to the idea of economic and political liberalism (which are often mis-
takenly identified). The doctrinal issues of the political economy of transition were 
based on the dictates of neoliberalism. Neoliberal ideology, specifically the Wash-
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ington Consensus, dominated economic transition reforms, determining the content, 
stages of the process, and dynamics. Domination primarily refers to important ele-
ments of neoliberal microeconomic policies: privatization, deregulation, and market 
solutions, while in the field of macroeconomic policy, neoliberalism implied follow-
ing strict rules in both monetary and fiscal policy, central bank independence, and the 
primary goal of low and stable inflation rates, while employment and economic activ-
ity, i.e., economic growth, were left to the operation of market forces. The literature 
of economic transition and international experts and economic policymakers have 
all neglected the importance of the institutional framework to transition economies.
At first, the process of economic transition appeared relatively simple, with citi-
zens in transition countries supporting the building of an economically superior market 
system and a democratic political system. This process was approached as a kind of 
“social engineering” (Cerović 2012, p.1), with the elements and phases of implemen-
tation and even the dynamics being prescribed. The transition was implemented in 
former socialist countries with the help of international experts. However, this universal 
approach had many limitations, which to date have been neglected. Among them are 
the specific conditions of individual countries, their historical  legacy, the size of their 
economies, the differing development of individual economic sectors and availability 
of natural resources (especially energy sources), and different cultures, specifically the 
political cultures that existed before and during the socialist period.
The group of transition economies was originally heterogeneous because their 
initial economic and political conditions were different. After three decades of tran-
sition this heterogeneity is even more obvious because of the different paths the polit-
ical and economic reform has taken in each economy. Achieving the complex transi-
tion goals was not going to result from spontaneous market forces or a simple break 
with the previous one-party political system, but required a well- conceived program 
to build a new economic and political system. Three trajectories of transition reform 
could be observed in transition countries (Turley and Luke 2011, p.7). The first trajec-
tory is that of the radical reforms in the Central European and Baltic countries, which 
were the most successful in achieving their goals, including accession to the Euro-
pean Union. The second trajectory is the gradual reforms implemented in Southeast-
ern Europe and most former Soviet republics, most of which are still experiencing 
problems building democratic institutions and consolidating democracy: their econ-
omies are still in the process of economic transition, burdened by the corruption 
and rent-seeking activities of policymakers, bureaucrats, and businessmen. The third 
trajectory has been implemented in several former Soviet republics in which the old 
political and economic systems still exist: dictatorship, monopoly of one political 
party, state control of the economy, and public ownership of businesses.
In many transition countries, skepticism concerning the reforms appeared ten 
years after the transition started (Cerović 2012, p.361). Two factors determined 
whether the transition programs were successfully implemented in each country: 
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how radical the measures adopted during transition were, and the initial conditions. 
More liberal political reforms had a positive effect on the reforms, while regional 
tensions were a factor hindering economic transition and economic progress. Over 
time, even more than radical reform, institutions were recognized as a particularly 
important factor influencing the effects and results of the transition process (Cerović 
2012, p.364).
It turned out that the goals that incumbents set in each country were decisive for the 
success of the transition process, as well as a consensus as to the necessity of the whole 
society accepting and evenly sharing the costs of transition. Accession to the European 
Union emerged as another important factor. The goal of joining the EU made difficult 
reforms more acceptable and accession meant meeting accession criteria, involving the 
market economic system, political democracy, and relevant institutions. The success 
of reforms and the completion of transition were reflected in accession to the Europe-
an Union. However, for their own opportunistic reasons, the creators of the transition 
process often prolonged the reforms or consciously implemented them inadequately, 
blaming various factors for their failure. In some transition countries structural chang-
es mirrored political cycles so that in the pre-election period the intensity of reforms 
decreased, only to intensify in the post-election years (Jula 2008).
The specific characteristics of voters in transition countries, the semi-democratic 
political systems, and other political factors such as national or religious conflict all 
facilitated this kind of manipulation, especially in the Western Balkan region and 
parts of the former Soviet Union where regional conflicts are frequent.
Specificities of voters and politicians in transition economies
Incumbents in developed economies have opportunistic and partisan political mo-
tives and  misuse fiscal and monetary economic policy in an attempt to get re-elected, 
and the same thing happens in transition economies. The specific economic and polit-
ical systems of transition countries lead to questions regarding both the incumbents’ 
motives and the specifics of the voters and political parties competing in elections. 
The next set of issues refers to underdeveloped institutional mechanisms related to 
monetary and fiscal policy and to both economic and ‘political’ politics. These in-
stitutional issues became very important in the implementation of political business 
cycle models (Jakšić and Praščević 2010).
The claim that elections are won or lost depending on the economic results of the 
government is confirmed in developed countries, and in transition countries it in-
cludes dimensions concerning the success of the transition process itself; i.e., public 
support for and commitment to the transition process. The analysis is complicated 
because the heterogeneous countries in the group of transition economies followed 
different paths, with different goals and varying success. The dynamics of the pro-
cess of economic and political transition made the complexity even greater: some of 
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the characteristics present in the first phases of transition do not remain present in all 
countries in the following phases because over time the successful countries begin 
to look like developed economies and consolidated democracies and the specifics of 
transitional societies disappear, while in others countries they still persist today, after 
three decades of transition.
The specifics of applying the political business cycle model, at least in the early 
stages of transition, can be summarized as follows:
1. The specific motives of incumbents in transition countries differ from those in 
developed countries.
2. Voters in transition countries have insufficient knowledge about the market econ-
omy system, democratic procedures, and political democracy.
The specific motives of incumbents refer to the structure of the political process 
and political parties in transition countries. Political parties in these countries do 
not have a clear ideological profile or program, nor an active and stable partisan 
membership. This provides many more opportunities for party leaders to influence 
and change partisan policy with the primary opportunistic motive of staying in or 
coming to power, especially in a proportional electoral system in which post-election 
coalitions are very likely.
In transition countries such unprofiled political parties face voters who are un-
familiar with the functioning of the new political system. The transition implies the 
withdrawal of the state as an active actor in the economic system, but sooner or later 
the question arises as to the degree of state influence and interference in the eco-
nomic sphere that is still necessary. This question concerns ideological differences 
between political parties, as well as the voters’ ideological preferences.
Opportunistic and partisan motives in transition economies
The behavior of incumbents is determined by opportunistic and partisan motives, 
which are also present in the case of countries in transition. The incentives are also 
basically the same – to be re-elected and to accomplish certain ideological/partisan 
goals. However, in transition countries the opportunistic motive is not only to hold 
political power but also to be in a position to undertake rent-seeking activities, which 
in developed economies are limited by the institutional framework.
In the first phase of transition, incumbents’ opportunistically motivated behavior 
was limited by macroeconomic problems in the form of high inflation, which was so 
serious that stimulating economic activity in order to win election was unlikely. The 
first stages of the transition process imposed high inflation and unemployment rates, 
which were to be solved using macroeconomic stabilization programs that induced 
a transitional recession and a large fall in GDP. This reduced voter support for the 
reform program from citizens who had little trust in political parties, government, 
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parliament, or even foreign economic experts. Thus, incumbents could lose re- elec-
tion, while decreased support for the economic and political reforms resulted in a 
reversal to a less democratic system and the functioning of the former economic 
system. Therefore, pre- election stimulation of the economy, using primarily fiscal 
policy, was tolerated in countries in transition because it kept pro-reform political 
forces in power – for example, in Serbia after Milošević was overthrown in October 
2000. Opportunistically motivated behavior by public authorities was justified, espe-
cially if the country was extremely politically polarized and there were significant 
differences in economic and political priorities and the parties’ goals, or when there 
was significant uncertainty about the election winner. Officials in transition countries 
depend on voters who are not always aware of the benefits or the necessity of transi-
tion processes and economic reforms.
During the first decade of transition the reforms were successful in the countries 
that had less polarized electorates and political parties. For this it was necessary to 
have a social consensus regarding the economic and political future of the country, 
which was often associated with foreign support in the form of possible accession to 
the European Union. The first transition countries that joined the European Union 
in 2004 experienced no significant political polarization, no reversals in economic 
policy, and no indecision as to the direction in which the country should go.
Although during the first phase of transition the voters in transition countries 
could be characterized as naïve and ripe for manipulation by policymakers, they 
learned quickly. As a result, the traditional model of opportunistic and partisan po-
litical cycles very quickly ceased to adequately analyze developments in transition 
economies. Rational opportunistic models began to gain in importance, such as those 
that focus on the problem of government competence regarding fiscal policy due to 
information asymmetry (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990).
Similarly, in transition countries ideological differences between parties of the left 
and right are specific and different to those in advanced economies and democratic 
countries. During the first phases of the transition, parties dominated that advocated 
– at least declaratively – significant political and economic reforms, with rapid privat-
ization and the denial of any need for government intervention in the economy. Often, 
such ideas were tied to right-wing parties that promoted neoliberal economic ideas 
along with a nationalistic agenda, especially in countries where there were ethnic ten-
sions. In the first phase the left-wing parties withdrew or, more precisely, took time to 
consolidate, because leftist ideas were connected with the earlier communist political 
system. Often, the different economic goals of political parties in transition countries 
came down to differences between pro-reform and counter-reform parties. In that 
case, as before, the opportunistic motives corresponded to a great extent with the 
model of rational partisan cycles (Alesina 1989; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997).
If there are significant ideological differences between the parties competing in 
elections, the issue of electoral uncertainty becomes especially important. It is also 
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necessary to integrate opportunistic and partisan motives into the models applied 
to transition economies. With the interaction of partisan and opportunist motives, 
both left and right-wing parties are trying to get closer to the so-called median voter, 
which becomes more important as the transition nears its end.
Dominance of budgetary political cycles in transition economies
In transition economies the central bank, as the key monetary institution, plays an 
important role in economic policy. The central bank should prevent both partisan and 
opportunistic political motives from influencing monetary policy in order to ensure 
its credibility and reduce uncertainty, which may be encouraged by the imperfect 
information available to economic agents and significant political instability and po-
larization. Some of these characteristics are present in democratic countries, where 
economic data shows that partisan differences in conducting monetary policy are 
stronger than opportunistically motivated manipulation (Alesina, Roubini, and Co-
hen 1997). The existence of partisan differences in the rate of monetary growth and 
the level of short-term and long-term interest rates is consistent with the rational–par-
tisan model of political cycles.
In order to eliminate the abuse of monetary policy, many transition economies 
have imposed institutional restrictions, primarily in the form of an independent cen-
tral bank, leading to higher independence indices than in developed economies. This 
is especially true for the successful transition economies. Empirical evidence in the 
period 1990–1999 for the 10 Eastern European accession countries (Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia) shows monetary political business cycles where the exchange rate is 
flexible and the central bank is dependent on the government. When the exchange 
rate is fixed and central bank is indepedent, incumbents misuse fiscal policy shortly 
before elections (Hallerberg and Souza 2000).
Incumbents attempting to artificially improve economic results in the pre-election 
period can use fiscal policy to redistribute income and improve the position of certain 
segments of society in accordance with incumbents’ partisan/ideological interests or 
opportunistic motives. The type of political cycle based on the relationship between 
the election cycle and fiscal policy is called a political budget cycle, and has been 
the subject of analyses of both groups of transition economies and specific countries 
(Hallerberg and Souza 2000; Treisman and Gimpelson 2001; Akhmedov and Zhu-
ravskaya 2004; Klašnja 2008; Lami and Imami 2014).
Political budget cycles are more present in underdeveloped economies and new 
democracies than in developed economies and democratic countries (Brender and 
Drazen 2005) because the political system is underdeveloped, voters do not under-
stand how it functions, and the politicians have specific motives when conducting 
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fiscal policy. Therefore, in the initial period of democratization voters are unable 
to make relevant choices; i.e., they are unable to anticipate the effects of expansive 
pre-election fiscal policy. They may be myopically oriented to the present and do 
not understand that the incumbents are accountable for macroeconomic outcomes 
over entire electoral periods. In that case politicians feel free to deceive with fiscal 
expansion and do not fear significant punishment because by winning the election 
they will secure their position in power. In the post-election period they will probably 
conduct restrictive policy, but  again without fearing for their survival in power as 
the voters are myopically oriented. The political institutional environment in these 
countries gives incumbents the opportunity to make significant profit or rent by stay-
ing in power, so they are motivated to manipulate voters in every possible way in the 
pre-election period (Shi and Svensson 2006).
As voters in these countries get wise to politicians’ characteristics and motives 
and become aware of the negative consequences of fiscal deficit, they become more 
fiscally conservative, similar to people in developed economies. In those circum-
stances government expenditure, i.e., revenue, is fiscally manipulated to no longer 
represent the total amount of the budget deficit: the structure is connected to the 
government’s competence to improve economic performance without causing a bud-
get deficit. Election-year government expenditure shifts towards more visible current 
consumption at the expense of reducing government investment, just as the rational 
opportunistic models assume (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990). The success 
of such manipulation depends on the existence of asymmetric information, which is 
connected to the state of democracy in a specific country. Empirical research from 
the former Soviet Union countries confirms such manipulation, especially in those 
countries that are partly democratic. In the most democratic former Soviet Union 
countries, the Baltic states, the degree of budget manipulation is lower, and in the 
least democratic countries (e.g., Tajikistan) only negligible changes could be found 
in budget expenditure in the pre-electoral period, due to the fact that the incumbents 
have complete control over the election institutions so the opposition party cannot 
win: the incumbents do not need to manipulate government expenditure since the 
regime is autocratic (Faychuk 2003). Such findings correspond with results show-
ing that the magnitude of manipulation depends on the incumbent’s probability of 
winning the election – the higher the probability, the less the manipulation (Faychuk 
2003).
The specifics of the political budget cycle model in transition countries are also re-
lated to the possibility of using revenue from the privatization of public assets for fis-
cal expansion in the pre- election period. Episodes of misuse of privatization revenue 
for fiscal manipulation of expenditure exist in Albania (Imami, Lami, & Kächelein 
2011) and Serbia (Praščević 2012) where privatization policies have been observed to 
fluctuate according to electoral and partisan cycles. Right-wing governments tend to 
privatise to a greater extent than governments with other ideologies due to a partisan 
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motive, and privatization will intensify before the election takes place, precisely in 
order to generate revenue that can finance increased government expenditure.
In the transition countries a lack of voter information becomes especially sig-
nificant due to restrictions on media freedom, which make it even more difficult for 
voters to obtain appropriate information relevant to the elections. These constraints 
are present in semi-democratic transition economies that allow voters to be deceived 
about policy measures. Indices that measure media freedom differ; however, they 
consider the freedom of traditional media, which continue to play an important role 
in restraining politicians, but also social media and internet access, which could help 
to enforce rules and accountability.
Conclusion
Theories of political business cycles assume that political elections are won or lost 
depending on the economic results that voters observe in the pre-election period. 
This  encourages policymakers to misuse economic policy in order to improve their 
re-election prospects by making macroeconomic performance in the pre-election pe-
riod better than it really is. Whether economic policymakers are able to do so depends 
primarily on the institutional arrangements that form the framework for conducting 
monetary and fiscal economic policy, and also on the characteristics of voters (naive 
or rational) and on characteristics of the political system. The elements of political 
business cycles can be found in transition economies where incumbents often misuse 
economic policy in order to artificially improve economic outcomes, rather than un-
dertaking more extensive and radical reforms. The specific characteristics of voters 
and of political parties, a semi-democratic political system, and undeveloped market 
economy institutional mechanisms contribute to politicians in power significantly 
and frequently misusing economic policy. Fiscal policy is manipulated more often 
than monetary policy, and models developed for transition countries should be based 
on the integration of both opportunistic and partisan motives. With the end of the 
economic transition and the building of a democratic system, the political business 
cycles in these countries become similar to those in developed economies.
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ENDNOTES
1 Ten years after his first model, Hibbs presented empirical evidence that US Democrats are more 
averse to unemployment than Republicans, and vice versa for the inflation rate (Hibbs 1987, p.227). 
The reason is very simple: parties represent the interests of different voters and social classes (low-
er-income workers have the most to lose from unemployment and upper-income groups have more to 
lose from the distributional consequences of high inflation).
2 As opposed to the historical–deductive method adopted by classical and Keynesian economists. The 
Keynesian revolution was a revolution in method; the same is the true for the rational expectations 
revolution and the rise of both New Classical Macroeconomics and New Keynesianism.
3 Between the fall of Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union on 26 
December 1991.
4 Including former Soviet or Eastern Bloc countries and China, with certain specifics.
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